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proclaimed) responsibility for perpetrating shooting attacks that targeted Israeli civilians. In both cases, the government of Israel had previously requested their arrest. Other times, Fatah officials had the capacity to check the background of the individuals named on the list, and thus could have ensured that no assistance would go to people who were responsible for attacks against civilians. At least two lists are extensively annotated, and unnamed functionaries are asked to present other names in order of merit.³⁷⁴

The clearest case in which President Arafat authorized payment despite the recipient's widely reported links to attacks on civilians was that of Ra'id al-Karmi, the al-Aqsa Brigades leader in Tulkarem.³⁷⁵ An undated request from Ramallah-based Fatah leader Hussein al-Sheikh asked Arafat to provide al-Karmi and two others with \$2,500 each; Arafat apparently authorized payments of \$600 each on September 19, 2001.³⁷⁶ The IDF had placed al-Karmi on its "most wanted" list in August 2001, accusing him of involvement in "numerous" shooting attacks and responsibility for the deaths of seven civilians and two soldiers. Al-Karmi himself openly boasted of his involvement in the execution-style killing of two Israeli restaurateurs visiting Tulkarem on January 23, 2001—in retaliation, he said, for Israel's assassination several weeks earlier of local Fatah leader Thabet Thabet.³⁷⁷ The PA had arrested al-Karmi and three others later in January 2001 in connection with the killing of the two restaurateurs, but he fled prison several months later. Al-Karmi had survived a well-publicized Israeli assassination attempt on September 6, 2001, shortly before President Arafat authorized the payment in question, and had spoken openly of his intention to continue attacks against Israelis.³⁷⁸

³⁷⁴ Some typical handwritten annotations next to individual names on the memo are "good fighter" and "we know him."

³⁷⁵ See "Arafat's Documents, Continuation" (in Arabic), IDF at <http://www.idf.il/arafat/continuation/english/index1.stm> (accessed October 10, 2002).

³⁷⁶ Government of Israel, "The Involvement of Arafat, PA Senior Officials and Apparatuses in Terrorism against Israel, Corruption and Crime," prepared by a team headed by Minister of Parliamentary Affairs (n.d.), Dani Naveh, p. 20. (Hereafter cited as Naveh.)

³⁷⁷ Al-Karmi also claimed that the restaurateurs were undercover intelligence agents. Israel claimed at the time that Thabet had been involved in attacks against Israeli targets. Human Rights Watch wrote to the government of Israel on January 29, 2001 requesting evidence for this allegation but did not receive a response. See Human Rights Watch press release and letter, "Israel: End 'Liquidation' of Palestinian Suspects," January 29, 2001.

³⁷⁸ Greg Myre, "Palestinians Die in Airstrike" Associated Press Online, September 6, 2001.

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In another captured document, al-Karmi approached Arafat via Marwan Barghouti, requesting payments to twelve “fighter brethren,” not including himself.³⁷⁹ Despite al-Karmi’s own self-proclaimed responsibility for attacks on civilians, Arafat granted a payment of \$350 to each individual on al-Karmi’s list, again without making any apparent effort to ensure that these fighters were not responsible for attacks on civilians. The payments were made on January 7, 2002, a week before al-Karmi was assassinated. At the time of his assassination, according to media reports, the PA had assured European Union officials that al-Karmi was under arrest.³⁸⁰ According to one report, he was assassinated “while visiting his wife and daughter during a furlough from the ‘protective custody’ of a PA jail.”³⁸¹

Atef Abayat was a Bethlehem-area al-Aqsa Brigades leader whose arrest Israel had requested as early as November 2000 after he had been involved in a clash with IDF soldiers near al-Khader village. A July 9, 2001, request by Kamal Hmeid, the head of Fatah in Bethlehem, for assistance of \$2,000 each to twenty-four local activists, including Abayat, apparently led to Arafat’s authorization of \$350 to each.³⁸² In early August 2001, before Arafat authorized the payment, Abayat had allegedly killed at least one Israeli civilian.³⁸³ Hmeid denied to the media that the funds were used to support armed attacks. “The money we receive is used for political and social activities only,” he said, without addressing the fact that the document listed Abayat among the recipients.³⁸⁴ Five weeks after the payment was authorized, Abayat allegedly

³⁷⁹ See “Arafat’s Documents, Continuation” Document 2, IDF at <http://www.idf.il/arafat/english/index1.htm> (accessed September 25, 2002).

³⁸⁰ Virginia Quirke, “Militants avenge Israeli killing; Fatah group calls off ceasefire after leader’s death, fuelling new upsurge in violence,” *Guardian* (London), January 15, 2002.

³⁸¹ Graham Usher, “Ending the phony cease-fire,” *Middle East International*, January 25, 2002, p. 4.

³⁸² This document was among those seized by Israeli authorities in the takeover of the Orient House in east Jerusalem in August 2001. Human Rights Watch obtained a poor copy of the original, identified as Appendix A, “Palestinian Authority Captured Documents, Main Implications,” IDF 688/0010, April 7, 2002.

³⁸³ Abayat was named by “security sources” as responsible for the February 11, 2001 roadside shooting of electrician Tzahi Sasson on the Jerusalem-Gush Etzion Tunnel Road. See Arieh O’Sullivan, Margot Dudkevitch, and Etgar Lefkovits, “Hiker killed in terror ambush; Tanzim fugitive dies in Bethlehem blast; Shots, mortars fired on Gilo,” *Jerusalem Post*, October 19, 2001.

³⁸⁴ Greg Myre, “Israel says seized document shows Arafat paying militant wanted by Israel,” *Associated Press*, March 21, 2002. “Arafat is too clever to use written documents that would link him to attacks,” said Boaz Ganor, head of the Israel-based International

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killed another civilian. PA security forces attempted to arrest Abayat on October 2 (see above), but allowed him to go free following a confrontation with his armed supporters. Israeli forces assassinated Abayat on October 18, 2001.

Another person on the list of three for whom President Arafat authorized a \$600 payment in September 2001 was Ziad Da'as, a member of the al-Aqsa Brigades in Tulkarem and reportedly the successor to al-Karmi as leader of the group there. At the time when the payment was authorized, so far as Human Rights Watch could determine, Da'as had not been publicly linked with attacks against civilians. However, the February 2002 "memo to Tirawi" (see below) named Da'as as the leader of one of three al-Aqsa Brigades "squads" in Tulkarem and attributed to him a leading role in the deadly shooting attack on civilians claimed by the al-Aqsa Brigades in the Israeli city of Hadera on January 17, 2002. Da'as's name also appears among twenty-five activists listed on a memorandum from Marwan Barghouti requesting President Arafat's approval of financial assistance. The document is undated, and there is no indication of whether Arafat approved the request.

Human Rights Watch identified five cases in which Israeli analysts allege that an individual requesting financial assistance had direct involvement in suicide attacks against civilians.³⁸⁵ The documents do not indicate whether any of these requests were granted. Of those requests that were dated, each was

Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, commenting on this document. "He knows how to incite people, how to create the atmosphere, but in a way that doesn't directly point to him."

³⁸⁵ Nasser Yusuf Abu Hamid (Ramallah) was alleged to have participated in the "direction of suicide attacks inside Israel"; Tareq Muhammad Daud and Sharif Muhammad Abu Hamid were alleged to have also been involved in planning suicide attacks. Their names occur on a list of Tanzim members signed by Marwan Barghouti November 7, 2000; no request for payment was made. See Document 4 of "Additional Captured Documents Reveal Again the System of Money Transfers to Terrorist Squads, Personally Authorized by Yasser Arafat, with the Deep Involvement of Marwan Barghouti," IDF TR6-498-02, 24 June 2002. Obtained by Human Rights Watch from the Office of the Prime Minister of Israel. Ashraf Yusuf Hamed Bani Jabr and Ibrahim Mahmud 'Abdul-Rahman Diriyah were alleged to be involved in attempts to send "suicide terrorists" into Israel. Their names appear in a request for financial aid dated July 19, 2001; the date of their alleged involvement in the attacks is not specified. There is no indication that the request was approved. See Document 7 "Additional Captured Documents Reveal."

³⁸⁵ See "The Involvement of Arafat, PA Senior Officials and Apparatuses in Terrorism Against Israel, Corruption and Crime," Chapter II, Document 3 at <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0lom0> (accessed September 20, 2002). An undated request for assistance was made on behalf of Firas Sabri Fa'iz, who allegedly participated in the murder of two Israeli restaurateurs in January 2001. There is no indication of approval.

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made several months before the first al-Aqsa Brigades suicide attacks against civilians.

In addition to Da'as, al-Karmi, and Abayat, two individuals listed in the various requests for financial assistance are alleged by the Israeli authorities to have participated in attacks against civilians. Of these two requests, Arafat authorized one: a payment of \$800 to Bilal Abu 'Amsha on April 5, 2001. Israeli authorities allege that Abu 'Amsha was responsible for the shooting of a sixty-three-year-old man on May 31, 2001, seven weeks after the payment was authorized.

Requests for financial assistance were typically presented to Marwan Barghouti, in his capacity as secretary-general of Fatah in the West Bank, who then presented them to Arafat. Other senior Fatah figures, such as Hussein al-Sheikh, also forwarded such requests. The size of requested financial assistance differed according to an individual's seniority, but generally ranged from the equivalent of \$300 to \$800. President Arafat's authorization typically consisted of a handwritten instruction to the "ministry of finance" to make the payment(s) indicated. These recipients were described in the funding requests as, variously, "brothers," "fighting brothers," or simply "pursued by the occupation forces and deserving of aid." Most of the recipients appear to be Fatah-associated, except for two identified by Israeli analysts as PFLP members and one identified by Israeli analysts as an Islamic Jihad member.³⁸⁶

Human Rights Watch was unable to ascertain whether such payments and funding practices continued in 2002, after the al-Aqsa Brigades began to carry out suicide bombing attacks against civilians. Several documents from the Fatah branches in the Jenin and Nablus districts, from which many al-Aqsa Brigades attacks against civilians emanated, complained about an absence of funds for armed militants. (See above.)

In the cases of Ra'id al-Karmi and Atef Abayat, President Arafat authorized financial assistance to persons whom he knew or should have known had been involved in attacks against civilians. These payments, while small in amount and few in number, demonstrate Arafat's disturbing indifference to, if not possible support for, Palestinian attacks on civilians.

President Arafat should take immediate steps to ensure that in the future no financial assistance is given to individuals engaged in attacks against civilians, and should enforce and make public a requirement not to attack civilians as a condition of any future payments.

³⁸⁶ See in particular, "International Financial Aid to the Palestinian Authority Redirected to Terrorist Elements," IDF TR2-317-02, May 26, 2002.

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Requests for Palestinian Authority Financial Assistance from Armed Groups

According to press reports, President Bush was shown Israeli intelligence reports of a direct payment of \$20,000 made or authorized by President Arafat to the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades shortly after two suicide attacks against civilians claimed by the Brigades.³⁸⁷ Evidence supporting this allegation of payment has not been made public.

Of the body of materials released publicly by the IDF, two documents on al-Aqsa Brigades letterhead were allegedly discovered by the IDF in the main PA compound. The IDF has claimed that the documents:

Reveal that the Al-Aqsa Brigades is an established organization, which holds official correspondence with Fu'ad Shubaki's office in order for it to finance its planned operations. This money does not go merely to finance propaganda concerning terrorists involved in attacks, but also to control the planning of future attacks.³⁸⁸

One undated memo, on letterhead emblazoned in Arabic and English "al-Aqsa Martyres [sic] Troops Palestine," consists of a handwritten costing of salaries, rent, and tools such as lathes and milling machines, totaling some \$80,000.³⁸⁹ The IDF analysis asserts that the items indicate "an ambitious plan... to establish a heavy arms production workshop," including mortars.³⁹⁰

The second document is a financial report, typed on similar letterhead and dated September 16, 2001.³⁹¹ It reports debts of 38,000 Israeli shekels (\$8,800 US dollars), indicating, at a minimum, that the al-Aqsa Brigades considered they had a reporting relationship with the recipient. The breakdown of expenses includes the production of martyrs posters, memorial ceremonies, "electrical parts and various chemical materials" for manufacturing explosives, and

³⁸⁷ Todd S. Purdum and Patrick E. Tyler, "Aides to Bush Say Arafat Financed a Terrorist Group," *New York Times*, June 26, 2002.

³⁸⁸ IDF Communique, "Yasser Arafat's 'Mukata'a' Compound in Ramallah – A Center for Controlling and Supporting Terrorism," April 2, 2002 at <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0lg70>, (September 20, 2002). Note that original text spelled al-Aksa Brigades and Fu'ad Shoubaki differently.

³⁸⁹ "Arafat and the PA's Involvement in Terrorism (According to Captured Documents)," Appendix B, Document 1, IDF 688/0018, April 22, 2002. Human Rights obtained a hard copy from the Office of the Prime Minister, Jerusalem.

³⁹⁰ Ibid.

³⁹¹ Ibid.

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ammunition.³⁹² The report also requests an immediate transfer of funds to purchase Kalashnikov bullets.

Neither document was signed. There is no indication in the scanned originals of the office(s) or individual(s) to whom the documents were addressed or whether they were ever approved. The IDF has said that the documents were addressed to Fu'ad Shubaki, and seized from the government compound in Ramallah. Shubaki, a close associate of Arafat, held the official title of head of the financial directorate of the General Security Service, but has frequently been characterized in media reports as Arafat's chief financial officer.³⁹³

If it can be verified that the two documents were addressed to high-ranking PA officials, they would represent the clearest available evidence of some level of financial and hence operational relationship between officials of the PA and the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. The dates of the documents place them prior to the al-Aqsa Brigades' involvement in suicide bombing attacks against civilians, although at a time when the al-Aqsa Brigades did routinely carry out shooting attacks against civilians as well as military targets in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

A third document, the aforementioned "memo to Tirawi," indicates that in Tulkarem a funding relationship existed between Fatah and some local al-Aqsa Brigades groups. The memo notes that "the Tanzim secretariat provides...sums of money from the Tanzim and emergency budgets as allocations to the armed brothers."³⁹⁴ The memo does not indicate how much money is provided, or that there are any restrictions or conditions attached, although it does indicate that the sums were "small," leading to disputes among competing groups of al-Aqsa Brigades militants. Elsewhere the memo states that while most of the militants owned their own rifles, contributions from Tanzim and "financial assistance collected from his excellency the president" helped to defray the cost of three additional rifles. It is not clear from the memo whether President Arafat was aware of the purpose of this collection, or when these funds were "collected."

³⁹² Ibid.

³⁹³ Shubaki, at the time of writing, was one of six Palestinian prisoners detained under international supervision in Jericho as a result of alleged involvement in the Karine-A affair, an attempt to smuggle weapons banned under the Oslo Accords into PA areas. For a summary of Israeli allegations against Shubaki, see <http://www.idf.il/project1/english/index.stm> (accessed October 11, 2002).

³⁹⁴ Several partial renditions of this document have been made public by the Israeli government. A complete but poor translation of the Arabic original is available from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs at <http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0100>. Translated by Human Rights Watch.

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In the view of Human Rights Watch, the PA had an obligation to check where funds it controlled were going and how they were being spent. Many PA officials were also leading members of Fatah. In that capacity, they also had a responsibility to check the backgrounds of individuals and groups to ensure that neither PA nor Fatah funding went to individuals or groups that had been involved in attacks against civilians. Regrettably, President Arafat and other senior Fatah officials did provide financial assistance to people involved in planning and carrying out armed attacks that included attacks on civilians (other than suicide bombings). In doing so, these officials seriously abrogated their responsibility as the governing authority to prevent such attacks. However, the publicly available evidence is not conclusive as to whether President Arafat or the PA provided financial support to the perpetrators of attacks against civilians with the intent of supporting such attacks.

Participation of PA Security Officials in Suicide Bombings or Other Attacks on Civilians

Based on its own investigation as well as media accounts and publicly available, captured PA documents, Human Rights Watch identified instances in which individuals employed in one or another Palestinian security force were involved in shooting or suicide bomb attacks targeting civilians. Human Rights Watch also found that individual members of the PA security forces have had ongoing associations with armed groups that have carried out suicide bombing attacks on civilians. On at least two occasions, individual members of PA intelligence services assisted perpetrators in carrying out such attacks.³⁹⁵

The PA should have made credible efforts to reprimand, discipline, or, where appropriate, bring to justice members of its own security services who, in apparent disregard for declared PA policies, participated in or lent support to those responsible for attacks against civilians. Insofar as Human Rights Watch could determine, it did not do so.

The IDF has made its most specific allegations about PA security forces' involvement in attacks against civilians with regard to the General Intelligence Services (GIS), a force of about one thousand. The West Bank head of the GIS is Tawfiq Tirawi. An IDF spokesperson's statement of July 2, 2002, claimed that "in the past two years the [GIS] apparatus has been involved in hundreds of shooting and bombing attacks against Israeli civilian and military targets" and that "commanders of the Palestinian General Intelligence, including the head of

³⁹⁵ According to statistics compiled by B'Tselem, PA security forces gunfire was responsible for a total of ten Israeli civilian deaths inside Israel and none in the West Bank or Gaza.

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the organization, directed terror cells in various locations in the West Bank.³⁹⁶ During the IDF siege of President Arafat's headquarters in late September 2002, Israel named Tirawi as among those people in Arafat's remaining building who were "wanted" for alleged "terrorist" activity.

The charges against Tirawi, which he has denied, appear to be based primarily on the results of IDF or Shin Bet interrogations of captured Palestinians. In commentary on documents the IDF says it captured from PA offices in April 2002, Israeli analysts wrote that "wanted terrorist activists who were detained in Operation Defensive Wall reported in their interrogation of the direct involvement of Tirawi and his men in recruiting terrorists, their preparation, and the supply of ammunition for their operations."³⁹⁷

The most incriminating document made public by the Israeli authorities—the "memo to Tirawi"—suggests that Tirawi may have viewed attacks on civilians positively. Hamdi Darduk, the head of the GIS in Tulkarem, describes to Tawfiq Tirawi the competitive dynamics among the local armed militants, numbering fifteen to twenty in all. Referring to one group of militants who are willing to operate "on bypass roads and even in the depth of Israel," Darduk notes that they have been responsible for such "qualitative and successful activities," as the shooting attack on a bat mitzvah celebration in Hadera on January 17, 2002. Darduk said that these "men are very close to us and [we are] in constant coordination and contact with them."

The memo expresses frustration that there is "no clear address" for the al-Aqsa Brigades in Tulkarem, and characterizes the attitude of al-Aqsa Brigades militants towards the Tulkarem security services as "defiant and quarrelsome." Darduk complains that the armed factions "stand united vis-à-vis any problem arising with the security services" but "revert to their [divided] state" once the immediate tension with the authorities is resolved. He recommends that the "outstanding individuals" be selected "to train them for the future" and names

³⁹⁶ The statement claimed that Tirawi "personally directed" Mustafa Mardi, a PFLP activist captured on June 11, to carry out shooting attacks. Mardi allegedly confessed that he had participated in several attacks, including the kidnapping and murder of a teenager from the Pisgat Zeev settlement. Mardi also allegedly confessed that Tirawi had given him a rifle and assigned him to a cell of armed activists in the Ramallah area. Tirawi responded that "the entire Shin Bet statement is a lie from A to Z," and that the GIS had itself arrested Mardi in the past. See Amos Harel, "Israel is targeting Tirawi as a wanted man," *Ha'aretz*, July 3, 2002.

³⁹⁷ "Operation Defensive Wall detainees demonstrate unequivocally the involvement of the PA General Intelligence in direct and indirect assistance to terrorist activities," IDF Captured Document (undated), circa April 2002, http://www.idf.il/Involvement/english/main_index.stm (accessed May 30, 2002)."

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Ziad Da'as and Bilal Abu 'Amsha (see above) among those to be selected.³⁹⁸ The memo recommends "weeding out some of the outsiders" to "discard their financial burden and the problems they cause," and providing financial and other support to the most desirable individuals.

There is no record of any response by Tirawi to this memorandum, or indication that he read it, but the contents show that in Tulkarem the GIS was well aware of who was who among the armed militants affiliated with Fatah and was keen to work with them despite the involvement of some in attacks on civilians. The memo suggests that the GIS was at that time not playing a leading or controlling role in attacks by the al-Aqsa Brigades; rather, tone and content reflect an attempt to assert influence in a situation over which they had lost control. There is no indication, however, that preventing Palestinian attacks against Israeli civilians is among the goals of the GIS in Tulkarem. On the contrary, the writer, addressing the senior GIS officer for the West Bank expressly condoned attacks on civilians, recommended financial support for the perpetrators, and displayed no hesitation about conveying that approval to his superiors.

If this memo accurately reflects GIS policy, it would indicate that at least one PA security service intentionally assisted or sought to assist armed activity by al-Aqsa Brigades militants that included attacks against civilians.³⁹⁹

Majid Hamad Attari, the head of Preventive Security in Bethlehem, told Human Rights Watch that his agency's clear instructions since the beginning of the current uprising were to stop attacks against Israelis—"all attacks, not just inside Israel, and not just against civilians." The only times when this broke down, he said, was when the IDF launched attacks directly against Palestinian forces. "The orders even then were, 'Get out of the way, do not resist,'" Attari said, but he indicated that some officers did on those occasions return fire.

³⁹⁸ Ziad Da'as was killed by Israeli forces in Tulkarem on August 8, 2002. There are varying accounts as to whether he was assassinated or executed, as Palestinian witnesses told local journalists, or whether he had been shot while trying to escape. See *Duluth News-Tribune*, August 8, 2002 (accessed October 8, 2002).

³⁹⁹ The memo does not bear any indication of circulation or approval. Of some seventy different documents made public by Israel that Human Rights Watch has examined, including documents provided by Israeli officials in response to Human Rights Watch's request for the strongest available evidence of systematic PA involvement in, or support for, suicide bombings against civilians, it is the only one that indicates such involvement by the PA authorities.

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Human Rights Watch has documented instances in which PSS employees participated in exchanges of fire with IDF forces.⁴⁰⁰

Several people interviewed by Human Rights Watch indicated that the PA policy against the participation of security forces in clashes had led many to quit the forces. One person identified by the IDF as a PSS employee wanted for al-Aqsa Brigades activities is 'Ata Abu Rumaila. In an interview with Human Rights Watch in Jenin refugee camp, Rumaila introduced himself as a senior Fatah member there. He acknowledged that he had been in the *mukhabarat* (intelligence services), but said he had resigned and no longer served in any official capacity.⁴⁰¹ "There were a large number of defections," said 'Awni al-Mashni, a Fatah leader in Dheisheh refugee camp. Al-Mashni distinguished between those who quit the forces to join "the resistance" and those who had responded when under Israeli attack but otherwise did not take part in attacks against Israelis and who remained on the force.⁴⁰²

At least two members of the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades organized or carried out suicide attacks against Israeli civilians while reportedly serving in low-level positions in the PA. Said Ramadan, an employee of the PA naval police, carried out an indiscriminate shooting attack in Jerusalem on January 22, 2002. Ibrahim Hassouna, a Nablus-based employee of the naval police, carried out a shooting attack against civilians at the Sea Market restaurant in Tel Aviv on March 5, 2002.⁴⁰³ The cases of Ramadan and Hassouna indicate that the al-Aqsa Brigades recruited from the ranks of low-level PA security employees.⁴⁰⁴

⁴⁰⁰ For example, during an IDF arrest raid in Artas, near Bethlehem, on January 29, 2002.

⁴⁰¹ Human Rights Watch interview, Jenin refugee camp, June 11, 2002. The term *mukhabarat* is frequently used to refer generically to state security agencies as well as to formally designated intelligence agencies. Abu Rumaila noted that several attacks had been launched from Jenin against the nearby Israeli town of Afula in response, he said, to Israeli attacks. The IDF website cites, but does not provide, a captured document about a suicide bomb attack in Afula "in which PA intelligence apparatus activists from Jenin were involved together with the PIJ [Islamic Jihad]."

⁴⁰² Human Rights Watch interview, Dheisheh refugee camp, June 13, 2002. An example of those who have left the employ of the PA security services to work with the armed activists is Jamal Abu Samhandanah, a former police major who is now a leader in the Popular Resistance Committee in Gaza. See the *Observer* (London), February 23, 2002.

⁴⁰³ Lee Hockstader and Daniel Williams, "Mideast fighting intensifies; Both sides vow more," *Washington Post*, March 6, 2002.

⁴⁰⁴ One al-Aqsa Brigades statement at the time the IDF launched Operation Defensive Shield "call[ed] on all members of the Palestinian security services to join the ranks of the Brigades." The statement also referred to the Brigades as being "under the leadership

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Israel has stated that on April 16, 2002, it captured Muhammad Araj, a member of the GIS, in the Qalandiyya refugee camp outside Ramallah with two belts for carrying explosive devices and two "suicide letters."

Based on documents made public by the IDF, it appears that Arafat approved the recruitment of armed militants for the Palestinian security services in 2001. One example is a list requesting the employment of fifteen individuals sent to Arafat in mid-May 2001 (and again in early August) from Fatah leaders in Hebron. At least two of the individuals named in this document were wanted by Israel for earlier attacks against civilians.⁴⁰⁵ One of these, Zaki Hamid al-Zaru, is alleged to have been the sniper who killed a baby girl and wounded her father in a shooting attack against Israeli settlers in Hebron on March 26, 2001.⁴⁰⁶ The second, Marwan Zallum, authored the request in his capacity as head of the Fatah district branch in Hebron. Arafat transferred the August version of the memo to various security force commanders "for action." Five months after the May request, Zallum was reportedly placed on a list of Israel's "most wanted" armed Palestinians. He was allegedly involved in the April 12, 2002, suicide attack on the Mahane Yehuda Market, and was assassinated on April 22, 2002.⁴⁰⁷ An IDF communiqué on that day listed numerous shootings and other attacks against military targets and civilians, including the Hebron sniper attack of March 26, 2001, which it said were carried out "under [Zallum's] direct orders."⁴⁰⁸

However, the available evidence does not establish that PA recruitment of Fatah activists to the ranks of the PA security forces was done with the intent of supporting or endorsing attacks against civilians. The IDF, in its own analysis of PA recruitment practices, notes that such recruitment appeared to be an effort by PA officials "to integrate Fatah and Fatah/Tanzim activists into the PA's security apparatuses.... The 'deal' offered to them was monthly salary...in

of Marwan Barghuti." See "Al-Aqsa Brigades call for unity, name Barghuti as leader for first time," Agence France-Presse, April 1, 2002.

⁴⁰⁵ See "Document 1" and "Document 2" http://www.idf.il/english/announcements/2002/april/Fatah_Activists/3.stm (accessed October 10, 2002).

⁴⁰⁶ For an account of this incident see Human Rights Watch, *Center of the Storm*, pp. 63-65.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁸ See "IDF kills head of military wing Tanzim in the Hebron area," April 22, 2002 at <http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH01lk0> (accessed October 10, 2002). This summarizes IDF allegations against Zallum.

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exchange for the activists operating in accordance with PA policies.”⁴⁰⁹ The problem, the analysts continue, is that these activists continued to receive PA salaries “even when they refused to participate in activities in the framework of the security forces” and “even while they are included on Israel’s list of most wanted terrorists which was transferred to the PA....”⁴¹⁰

The most prominent example, cited by the IDF analysts, is that of Nasr ‘Awais, a Nablus-based leader of the al-Aqsa Brigades in the northern West Bank. Israeli forces captured ‘Awais in April 2002.⁴¹¹ Israel has accused him of responsibility for sponsoring suicide attacks in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Umm al-Fahm beginning in January 2002. Palestinian sources in Nablus confirmed to Human Rights Watch that ‘Awais played a leading role in al-Aqsa Brigades operations there, including attacks inside Israel originating in the northern West Bank.⁴¹² According to the IDF, ‘Awais remained on the payroll of the GIS despite “in recent months” his involvement in planning and carrying out attacks against Israeli civilians.⁴¹³ However, some press reports in March 2002 referred to ‘Awais as a “former” officer.⁴¹⁴ By one account, ‘Awais was among several PA security employees sacked by Arafat in December 2001.⁴¹⁵ Further investigation is needed to resolve these conflicting allegations.

⁴⁰⁹ See “The PA employs in its Ranks Fatah Activists Involved in Terrorism and Suicide Attacks” at http://www.idf.il/english/announcements/2002/april/Fatah_Activists/1.stm (accessed October 11, 2002).

⁴¹⁰ Israel considers all political violence directed against Israelis to constitute terrorism, without regard to the civilian or military nature of those targeted.

⁴¹¹ Devorah Chen, the prosecutor in the trial of Fatah leader Marwan Barghout, has said that the Israeli government’s case would be based on, among other things, testimony of ‘Awais and other captured militants. See “Palestinian leader indicted on terror charges,” Associated Press, August 14, 2002.

⁴¹² Human Rights Watch interviews, names withheld on request, June 2002.

⁴¹³ “The Palestinian Authority Employs in its Ranks Fatah Activists Involved in Terrorism and Suicide Attacks” at http://www.idf.il/english/announcements/2002/april/Fatah_Activists/1.stm (accessed October 11, 2002).

⁴¹⁴ Mohammed Daraghme, “Palestinian Group: Attacks Won’t Stop,” Associated Press, March 22, 2002.

⁴¹⁵ See Mohammed Daraghme, “Link to the Fatah movement is spiritual, not organizational.... The al-Aqsa Brigades: Palestinian blood to answer Israeli explosives” (in Arabic). Arab Media Internet Network, March 23, 2002 at <http://www.amin.org/mohammed.daraghme/2002/mar/mar23.html> (accessed on September, 8 2002).

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Israel has accused Jamal Tirawi, head of GIS in Nablus, and Jihad Masimi, head of criminal investigations for the Nablus police, of having helped to direct suicide bomb operations.⁴¹⁶ Maher Fares, the head of Military Intelligence (MIS) in Nablus, is accused by Israel of operating a cell that placed explosives on a Tel Aviv bus on December 28, 2000, wounding nine.⁴¹⁷ Evidence for the allegations against these three individuals, however, has not been made public. Colonel Abu Hamdan, of MIS in Nablus, is named in captured Palestinian intelligence documents as the leader of the Battalions of the Return, a small, armed group of uncertain provenance.⁴¹⁸

Security Officials' Protection of Individuals "Wanted" by Israel

Human Rights Watch researchers have documented instances in which PA intelligence officials warned Palestinians that they were "wanted" by Israeli authorities for armed activities. In one case, members the family of R., a reputed member of the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and planner of suicide attacks against civilians, told Human Rights Watch that he had several times been warned by former colleagues in the General Intelligence Service (GIS) of impending Israeli attempts to capture or assassinate him.⁴¹⁹ Whether such warnings were the result of personal loyalties or official policy was not clear.

Documents made public by Israel also indicate instances in which local security or intelligence officials issued warnings to Palestinians who were "wanted" by Israel, although for the most part there is no indication that this "wanted" status was a result of allegations of involvement in suicide bombings or other attacks on civilians. For example, one letter dated May 21, 2001, from the GIS in Tulkarem to the director of the GIS Ramallah Governorate office, refers to an attached list (not made public) of names of 232 people wanted by Israel.⁴²⁰ At the bottom of the letter is a handwritten annotation, "Please inform the brothers whose names are mentioned above to stay alert and pay attention.

⁴¹⁶ "Nablus, the Infrastructure Center for Palestinian Terrorism," IDF Document, Appendix G, http://www.idf.il/arafat/schem/english/main_index.stm, April 2002 (accessed September 30, 2002). Tirawi and Masimi are both listed as being "alive" and "operational" as of April 2002. Jamal Tirawi, according to the IDF, is a cousin of West Bank GIS chief Tawfiq Tirawi.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid.

⁴¹⁸ Some reports link the Battalions of the Return with dissident Fatah leaders based in Lebanon, while others suggest that it may be an offshoot of Islamic Jihad.

⁴¹⁹ Human Rights Watch interviews, February 4, 2002, Salfit.

⁴²⁰ "Arafat and the PA's Involvement in Terrorism According to Captured Documents," Appendix B, Document 3, IDF, April 22, 2002.

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Also, do a full security check on all those names and let us know.”⁴²¹ There are no indications as to why those listed were wanted by the Israelis: two were annotated as being affiliated with different PA security services.

Some documents made public by Israel suggest that payoffs by groups to individual security officers, rather than institutional policy, may have been a significant factor in helping members of armed groups evade capture. A memo to West Bank GIS head Tawfiq Tirawi from a person in Jenin whose position and affiliation are not made clear, cites an intelligence source as reporting that “the Hamas and [Islamic] Jihad movements have penetrated the security apparatuses in Jenin, by means of payoffs.” The report identifies Jamal Sweitat, deputy head of PSS in Jenin, as one of those people, asserts that he is “working for the [Islamic] Jihad from among General Intelligence and Preventive Security personnel,” and says that Sweitat, among other things, “often contacts” Islamic Jihad activists and “notifies [them] of planned arrests against them and who the wanted persons are.”⁴²² Six other intelligence employees are also reported to have received payoffs: three from the GIS, and two from the PSS.⁴²³ Israeli authorities have alleged similar practices in Bethlehem, saying that Islamic Jihad and Hamas made payments of between \$1,500 and \$3,000 to GIS and PSS officers to ensure that the recipients warned them of any imminent arrest attempts.⁴²⁴ The IDF has not released evidence for this allegation.

Conclusion

High-ranking PA officials, including President Arafat, failed in their duty to administer justice and enforce the rule of law in compliance with international standards. Through their repeated failure to arrest or prosecute individuals alleged to have planned or carried out suicide attacks against civilians, they contributed a climate of impunity—and failed to prevent the bloody

⁴²¹ Ibid. Translated by Human Rights Watch.

⁴²² The Cooperation Between Fatah and the PA Security Apparatuses with PIJ and Hamas in the Jenin Area. IDF document no. 688/0011, TR3-268-02, April 9, 2002. Hard copy obtained by Human Rights from the office of the Prime Minister of Israel. Also see “The PA and the Fatah Security Apparatuses in the Jenin area closely cooperate with Islamic Jihad and Hamas” at http://www.idf.il/jenin/site/english/main_index.stm.

⁴²³ Nayif Sweitat, Jamal’s brother and himself a Fatah leader in Jenin, told Human Rights Watch that the document’s allegation was “not true” and “part of a *mukhabarat* [GIS] effort to discredit Preventive Security.” Human Rights Watch interview, Jenin city, June 11, 2002.

⁴²⁴ “The Involvement of Arafat, PA Senior Officials and Apparatuses in Terrorism Against Israel, Corruption and Crime (The Naveh File)”, p. 32 at <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0lom0>.

consequences. Their payments to, and recruitment of, individuals responsible for attacks against civilians likewise demonstrate, at least, a serious failure to meet their political responsibilities as the governing authorities, if not a willingness to support them. However, there is no publicly available evidence that Arafat or other senior PA officials ordered, planned, or carried out such attacks.

Was this failure of President Arafat and the PA so egregious as to establish criminal liability for the actions of armed groups under the doctrine of command responsibility? In relation to Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the PFLP, there is no suggestion of the supervisor-subordinate relationship that is required to apply the doctrine. The PA could and should have exerted greater political pressure to bring these groups to halt suicide and other attacks on civilians, but that does not reflect the requisite control over their activities. In the case of the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, any supervisory link appears to have been weak at best. Nor does the PA's capacity to prosecute perpetrators, which it possessed for much of the uprising but did not apply, meet on its own the requirement of "effective control"—the ability to issue instructions, enforce obedience, and punish disobedience—that is necessary for the doctrine of command responsibility to apply. For example, even a government such as Colombia's, with a far more substantial law enforcement capacity, has not been found to have command responsibility for atrocities committed by paramilitary forces simply by virtue of the government's failure to prosecute them.⁴²⁵ But this is no excuse for inaction: the PA has a clear duty to act, in concert with regional leaders and the international community, to prevent suicide bombing attacks against Israeli civilians, ending the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Palestinian armed groups.

⁴²⁵ Human Rights Watch, *The Sixth Division: Military-Paramilitary Ties and U.S. Policy in Colombia* (Human Rights Watch, New York, September 2001).

APPENDIX ONE: CHRONOLOGY OF ATTACKS

Chronology of suicide bombing attacks on civilians and military targets from September 30, 2000 to August 31, 2002.

Dates underlined indicate incidents in which the targets were civilian, indiscriminate, or had a clearly disproportionate effect on civilians.⁴²⁶ The perpetrators are not included in the casualty count.

October 26, 2000

One IDF soldier was wounded when a suicide bomber from Gaza attacked an IDF post in Shuyaja, Gaza City. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

January 1, 2001

At least twenty people were wounded by a suicide bombing in a bus station in Netanya. Hamas claimed responsibility.

March 4, 2001

Three people were killed and at least sixty wounded when a suicide bomber attacked a shopping mall in Netanya. Hamas claimed responsibility. The bomber was a twenty-two-year-old refugee, Ahmad Ayam, from Tulkarem.

March 27, 2001

At least twenty-eight people were wounded when a bomber detonated explosives in his car adjacent to a bus in East Jerusalem. Hamas claimed responsibility.

March 28, 2001

Two teenagers were killed and four other people wounded when a suicide bomber blew himself up at a gas station one hundred meters from an IDF roadblock at Neve Yamin, near the entrance to Qalqiliya. Hamas claimed responsibility.

April 29, 2001

Only the perpetrator was killed when an attacker drove a car into a school bus in Shavei Shomron settlement, near Nablus. Hamas claimed responsibility.

⁴²⁶ This list was compiled on the basis of press reports and information from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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May 18, 2001

Five were killed and more than one hundred injured when a suicide bomber detonated himself in a Netanya shopping mall. Hamas claimed responsibility.

May 25, 2001

At least forty-five people were wounded when two suicide bombers drove an explosive laden truck into a bus in Hadera. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

June 1, 2001

Twenty one people were killed and at least 120 injured by a suicide bomb attack on the Dolphinarium discotheque in Tel Aviv. Although at first Islamic Jihad claimed the attack, later Hamas said it was responsible.

June 22, 2001

The driver of a jeep apparently stuck in the sand near Dugit, in the Gaza Strip, detonated explosives killing two IDF soldiers who had come to assist. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

July 9, 2001

A truck laden with explosives drove into the Kissufim border crossing in Gaza. Only the perpetrator was killed. Hamas claimed responsibility.

July 16, 2001

A suicide bomber attacked a bus stop in Binyamina, killing two and wounding at least eleven. Although the victims who died were IDF soldiers, some of the wounded were civilians. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

August 9, 2001

Fifteen people were killed and at least 130 injured when a suicide bomber attacked the Sbarro pizzeria on the Jaffa Road in downtown Jerusalem. Islamic Jihad and Hamas issued competing claims of responsibility.

August 12, 2001

Fifteen people were wounded when a twenty-eight-year-old suicide bomber detonated a bomb on the outside patio of a restaurant in Kiryat Motzkin, in Haifa. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

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September 4, 2001

At least thirteen people were injured when a suicide bomber disguised himself by wearing a skullcap and other observant attire and detonated himself in the ultra-Orthodox area of Me'ah Shearim, in West Jerusalem. Hamas claimed responsibility.

September 9, 2001

Three people were killed and at least ninety wounded when an Israeli Arab committed a suicide bombing attack on a group of soldiers and civilians disembarking a train in the Nahariya station. Hamas claimed responsibility.

October 7, 2001

The driver of a car was killed when a seventeen-year-old suicide bomber blew himself up near it at the entrance to a kibbutz in the Beit Shean valley, not far from Jenin. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

October 17, 2001

Two soldiers were wounded by an attack in Gaza. The PFLP claimed responsibility.

November 8, 2001

Two soldiers were wounded when a suicide bomber blew himself up during a raid on Baka al-Shargia, in the West Bank. Hamas claimed responsibility.

November 26, 2001

Two soldiers were wounded by an attack at Erez checkpoint in Gaza. Hamas claimed responsibility.

November 29, 2001

Three people were killed and at least six injured from a suicide bombing on a Nazareth-Tel Aviv bus at Pardes Hanna. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

December 1, 2001

Eleven people were killed and more than 130 injured after two suicide bombers set off sequential explosions followed by a car bomb in a pedestrian mall on Ben Yehuda street in West Jerusalem. Hamas claimed responsibility.

December 2, 2001

Fifteen people were killed and at least forty wounded by a suicide bomber on a Haifa city bus. Hamas claimed responsibility.

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December 5, 2001

At least two people were wounded by a suicide bomber in a hotel near the old city's Jaffa Gate; the perpetrator, Daoud 'Ali Ahmad Abu Suway, was a forty-four year old father of eight children from Artas, near Bethlehem. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

December 9, 2001

At least thirty people were wounded in a suicide bombing attack on a hitch hiking post in Haifa. The suicide bomber, who was not killed by the attack, was killed moments later in disputed circumstances, allegedly as he attempted to detonate more explosives and was shot by the police. Although no group claimed responsibility, the bomber had left a note that the attack was in reprisal for an assassination of a Hamas operative.

December 12, 2001

At least three people were slightly injured when two suicide bombers jumped on a car leaving a Gaza settlement.

January 25, 2002

Twenty five people were wounded by an eighteen-year-old suicide bomber in a Tel Aviv pedestrian mall. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack.

January 27, 2002

One person was killed and more than 111 wounded when a suicide bomber blew herself up in downtown Jerusalem. Wafa Idris, the perpetrator, was the first female suicide bomber. The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades claimed responsibility.

February 16, 2002

Three were killed and more than thirty wounded when a eighteen year old suicide bomber attacked a pizzeria in a shopping center in the Karnei Shomron settlement. The perpetrator had died his spiky hair blond, reportedly to be able to blend in. The PFLP claimed responsibility.

February 18, 2002

A policeman was killed when a suicide bomber he had stopped on the road between Maale Adumim settlement and Jerusalem, in the West Bank, detonated his explosives. The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades claimed responsibility.

Appendix One

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February 27, 2002

At least three people were wounded by a suicide bomber, Dareen Abu Eishi, who detonated explosives when asked for identity papers at the West Bank Maccabim checkpoint on the Modi'in-Jerusalem road. The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades claimed responsibility.

March 2, 2002

Eleven people, including five children, were killed and at least fifty wounded when a suicide bomber detonated in the ultra-Orthodox neighborhood of Me'ah Shearim in Jerusalem. The attack took place as a bar mitzvah was ending. The suicide bomber was a seventeen-year-old refugee from Bethlehem. The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades claimed responsibility.

March 5, 2002

One person was killed and at least eleven wounded in a suicide bombing attack on Afula bus station. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

March 7, 2002

Fifteen people were wounded in a suicide bombing attack on a hotel on the outskirts of Ariel settlement. The PFLP claimed responsibility.

March 9, 2002

Eleven people were killed and more than fifty injured when a twenty-year-old suicide bomber attacked the crowded Café Moment in Jerusalem. Hamas claimed responsibility.

March 17, 2002

Twenty-five people were wounded when a suicide bomber hurled himself at a bus in East Jerusalem. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

March 20, 2002

Seven were killed and at least twenty-seven wounded by a suicide bomb attack on a bus in Umm al Fahm in Galilee, near Afula. Four of the dead were IDF soldiers, fifteen of the wounded were civilians. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

March 21, 2002

Three were killed and more than sixty injured in an attack on a Jerusalem shopping street. The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades claimed responsibility.

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March 22, 2002

One soldier was wounded in a suicide bombing attack on an IDF checkpoint at Salem when he stopped the taxi the bomber used. The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades claimed responsibility.

March 27, 2002

Twenty-nine people were killed and more than one hundred injured by a suicide bomb attack in the Park Hotel in Netanya during a Passover Seder dinner. Hamas claimed responsibility.

March 29, 2002

Two people were killed and at least twenty wounded in an attack at a supermarket in the Kiryat Hayovel district of Jerusalem. The perpetrator was an eighteen-year-old woman. The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades claimed responsibility.

March 30, 2002

One person was killed and at least twenty injured in a suicide bomb attack on a restaurant on Allenby street in Tel Aviv. The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades claimed responsibility.

March 31, 2002

Fifteen people were killed and more than forty-four injured when a suicide bomber struck the Israeli-Arab owned Matza restaurant in Haifa. Hamas claimed responsibility.

March 31, 2002

Four people were wounded in an attack near a volunteer medical station in the Efrat settlement near Bethlehem. The suicide bomber was seventeen years old. The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades claimed responsibility.

April 1, 2002

A police officer died when a suicide bomber detonated himself when stopped at a checkpoint separating East and West Jerusalem. The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades claimed responsibility.

April 10, 2002

Eight people were killed and twenty-two people wounded in an attack near Ha'amaqim junction on a Haifa city bus crowded with commuters. Six of those killed were soldiers. Hamas claimed responsibility.

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April 12, 2002

Six people were killed and more than fifty injured in an explosion at a bus stop near the entrance of Mahane Yehuda market in Jerusalem.

May 7, 2002

Fifteen people were killed and at least fifty wounded in an attack on a pool hall in Rishon Letzion. According to Israeli government sources, Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

May 19, 2002

Three people were killed and more than thirty wounded by a suicide bomber dressed as an IDF soldier in the Netanya open air market. The bomber was eighteen years old. Both Hamas and PFLP issued claims of responsibility for the attack.

May 20, 2002

A suicide bomber killed only himself when stopped for questioning as he tried to board a bus at Taanakhim junction; the bus was headed for Afula.

May 22, 2002

Two people were killed and at least twenty-four wounded in a suicide bomb attack in Rishon Letzion; the bomber was sixteen years old. A second bomber, who changed her mind before the act, was later arrested. The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades claimed responsibility for the attack.

May 27, 2002

Two people, a baby and her grandmother, were killed and at least thirty-seven were wounded in an attack on the Bravissimo café in Petah Tikva. The bomber, a cousin of an al-Aqsa Brigades operative assassinated several days earlier, was eighteen years old. The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades claimed responsibility for the attack.

June 5, 2002

Seventeen people were killed and at least thirty-eight injured in a suicide attack at Megiddo Junction on a bus headed for Tiberias. Thirteen victims were IDF soldiers. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack.

June 11, 2002

One person was killed and fifteen wounded in an attack on a restaurant in Herzliyya. The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades claimed responsibility for the attack.

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June 17, 2002

A suicide bomber killed only himself in Kfar Salem, near where Israeli authorities had commenced construction of a security fence, when border police approached him.

June 18, 2002

Nineteen people were killed and seventy-four wounded by a bus traveling to Jerusalem from the nearby Gilo settlement. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

June 19, 2002

Seven people were killed and thirty-five wounded in an attack at a popular hitch hiking post in East Jerusalem. The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades claimed responsibility for the attack.

July 17, 2002

Four people were killed and twenty-five hospitalized in a dual suicide bombing near Tel Aviv's old station. Of the dead, three were foreign workers in Israel. Islamic Jihad initially claimed responsibility for the attack, although the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades later identified the attackers and also claimed responsibility.

July 30, 2002

At least five people were injured in a suicide attack on a falafel shop in central Jerusalem by Majd 'Atta, a seventeen-year-old from Beit Jala, near Bethlehem. The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades claimed responsibility for the attack.

August 4, 2002

Nine people were killed and thirty-seven injured in a suicide bombing attack on a bus traveling from Haifa to Safed in northern Israel. Of the dead, two were foreign workers in Israel, and three were soldiers. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

APPENDIX TWO: CHARTS

APPENDIX TWO: CHARTS

All charts relate to suicide attacks on Israeli civilians carried out from September 30, 2000 to August 31, 2002.

Chart 1

Overview: Suicide Bombings Attacks on Civilians

Chart 2

Timeline: Number of Suicide Bombing Attacks

Chart 4

Timeline: Number of Suicide Attacks Indicating Perpetrator Groups

Chart 5

Victims killed by Suicide Bombers

Chart 7

Proportion of Military to Civilian Victims by Perpetrator Group

Chart 8

Number of Suicide Bombing Attacks, by Four Main Perpetrator Groups

Chart 9

Victims killed in suicide bombing attacks, by Four Main Perpetrator Groups

Chart 10

Hamas: Basic Statistics

Chart 11

The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades: Basic Statistics

Chart 12

PFLP: Basic Statistics

Chart 13

Islamic Jihad: Basic Statistics

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CHART 1

**Overview: Suicide Bombings Attacks on Civilians
from September 30, 2000 — August 31, 2002**

	Group Responsible						TOTALS
	Hamas	al-Aqsa	Islamic Jihad	PFLP	Jointly claimed ¹	Not claimed	
Number of attacks	22	16	12	3	3	4	60
Attacks in which targets were civilian, indiscriminate and/or disproportionate. ²	18	12	11	2	2	2	48
Total killed	168	38	31	3	22	0	262
Civilian deaths ³	153	36	12	3	22	0	226
IDF/police deaths	15	2	19	0	0	0	36
Mean number of victims killed per attack (with standard deviation)	7.63 (8.18)	2.37 (2.98)	2.58 (4.77)	1.00 (1.41)	7.33 (7.91)	N/A	4.57 (6.45)
Total wounded (minimum estimates)	986	435	206	47	185	33	1892
Mean number of victims wounded per attack (with standard deviation)	44.82 (40.48)	27.19 (28.87)	17.17 (14.20)	15.67 (11.44)	61.67 (48.36)	8.25 (12.62)	31.44 (34.97)

¹ There were three attacks for which more than one group claimed responsibility. Islamic Jihad and Hamas issued competing claims of responsibility for the August 9, 2001 attack on the Sbarro pizzeria, Jerusalem, killing fifteen civilians and injuring thirty. Hamas and the PFLP both claimed the May 19, 2002 attack on the Netanya market, killing three civilians and injuring thirty. Islamic Jihad and the Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades both claimed the July 17, 2002 attack near Tel Aviv railway station, killing four civilians and injuring twenty-five.

² This category does not include eight incidents in which the suicide attack was committed by a bomber during the process of apprehension by the authorities.


³ Data on the status of victims is based on information from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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CHART 2

Timeline: Number of Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Civilians
September 30, 2000 – August 31, 2002

**CHART 3**

Number of Suicide Attacks Indicating Perpetrator Groups
September 30, 2000 – August 31, 2002






CHART 4

Timeline: Victims Killed by Suicide Bombers from September 30, 2000 – August 31, 2002¹

**CHART 5**



Proportion Of Military To Civilian Victims By Perpetrator Group from September 30, 2000 — August 31, 2002



¹ Data on the status of victims is based on information from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

CHART 6

Timeline: number of suicide bombing attacks, by four main perpetrator groups from September 30, 2000 — August 31, 2002



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CHART 6 (cont)

Timeline: number of suicide bombing attacks, by four main perpetrator groups from September 30, 2000 — August 31, 2002







CHART 7

Timeline: victims killed in suicide bombing attacks, by four main perpetrator groups from September 30, 2000 — August 31, 2002



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CHART 7 (cont.)

Timeline: victims killed in suicide bombing attacks, by four main perpetrator groups from September 30, 2000 — August 31, 2002






CHART 8**Hamas: Basic Statistics**

	Hamas	Joint¹
Number of suicide bombings claimed	22 of 60 total (37%)	2
Attacks in which targets were civilian, indiscriminate, and/or disproportionate	18	
Number of victims killed	168 (64%)	18
Civilian victims killed ²	153	18
Number of victims wounded (minimum estimates)	986 (52%)	60

Attack Location

¹ Attacks for which more than one group claimed responsibility. Hamas and Islamic Jihad issued competing claims for responsibility for the August 9, 2001 attack on the Sbarro pizzeria. Hamas and the PFLP issued competing claims for the May 19, 2002 attack on the Netanya market.

² Data on the status of victims is based on information from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

³ This category refers to incidents in which the suicide attack was committed by a bomber during the process of apprehension by the authorities. The intended target of the bomber is thus unknown.

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CHART 9**The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades: Basic Statistics**

	Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades	Joint¹
Number claimed	16 of 60 total (27%)	1
Attacks in which targets were civilian, indiscriminate, and/or disproportionate	12	1
Number of victims killed	38 (15%)	4
Civilian victims killed ²	36	4
Number of victims wounded (minimum estimates)	435 (23%)	25

Attack Location

¹ Attacks for which more than one group claimed responsibility. The Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and Islamic Jihad both claimed responsibility for a July 17, 2002 attack near Tel Aviv railway station.

² Data on the status of victims is based on information from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

³ The category refers to incidents in which the suicide attack was committed by a bomber during the process of apprehension by the authorities. The intended target of the bomber is thus unknown.